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Does Branded Food Product Advertising Help or Hurt Farmers?
An important issue for various commodity check off programs is how to treat processor/handler brand
advertising.  In programs that include a handler assessment, should handlers be given credit towards
their assessment for expenditures to advertise their own brands?  A related issue is whether check off
funds should be used to subsidize advertising of handlers' brands.  For example, the Florida Citrus
Commission has used check off funds to support advertising of well-known brands.  Export promotion
(MPP) funds support brand advertising abroad.  The goal of this research is to investigate market
conditions when processor/handler brand advertising will benefit or harm farmers in that industry and,
correspondingly, lend insight into the question of whether and when promotion funds intended to
benefit farmers should be used in support of brand advertising.
In some cases, brand advertising may be more effective in increasing demand for the farm
product than generic advertising. For example, Kaiser and Liu (1998) found that brand advertising of
cheese increased farm demand for milk, but brand advertising of fluid milk did not.  However, a
demand shift is only one of two effects that might be expected to result from brand advertising.  The
second effect is to increase the market power of the advertised brand.  Indeed prominent commentators
on the market structure of the food industry argue that extensive brand advertising has been a key
source of market power in the sector (e.g., Connor et al. 1985).  If market power increases as a
consequence of brand advertising, the advertising firm will, ceteris paribus, increase price and reduce
sales, thereby curtailing movement of the farm product and reducing farmer welfare.  Thus, even if
brand advertising is successful in shifting demand, it may be harmful to farmers.
This study utilizes a flexible oligopoly-oligopsony model to study the impacts of brand
advertising on farmer welfare.  The model is similar to that developed by Huang and Sexton (HS,
1996) and Alston, Sexton, and Zhang (ASZ, 1997) to study the returns to agricultural research
under alternative types of imperfect competition.  Whereas HS and ASZ studied exogenous2
research-induced shifts in farm supply, we study endogenous advertising-induced shifts in
consumer demand, but also allow the advertising expenditures to create or reinforce oligopoly
behavior among sellers.  We utilize a two-stage game formulation, where in stage 1 the firm(s)
decide expenditures on brand advertising, and in stage 2 compete in quantities, given the brand
identifications created in stage 1.  Market equilibria in both the presence and absence of brand
advertising are derived.  We then compare producer welfare both with and without brand
advertising and undertake simulation analyses to isolate market conditions wherein brand
advertising is likely to increase or decrease farmer welfare.
The Basic Model
Consider an agricultural industry with n processing firms.  A processor is assumed to convert raw
product q into processed product g according to the fixed proportions production g = min{q/λ ,
h(Z)}, where Z is a vector of processing inputs, and λ  = q/g is the fixed conversion rate between
raw and processed product.  Without loss of generality, we can set λ  = 1 through choice of
measurement units, so q = g.  The cost function associated with this production function is C(q) =
m(q)q + c(q) + f, where m(q) is the industry inverse supply function for the raw product, c(q) is the
cost associated with the processing inputs Z, and f ≥  0 represents fixed costs, if any.  It will be
convenient to assume that the processor operates with constant marginal costs and, hence, c(q) = cq.
We assume that firm 1 in this industry produces both a branded and a non-branded product.
The products are essentially undifferentiated except the branded product is advertised.  The
remaining n – 1 firms (i = 2, 3, …, n) produce only a non-branded product that is identical to the
first firm’s non-branded product.  Without the first firm’s brand advertising, all products are
homogeneous and all firms face the same market demand.  Firms engage in quantity competition in
the homogenous product market.  Firm 1’s brand advertising segments the retail market and creates
monopoly market power for firm 1 in the branded market and also expands the total market.  Firm 13
chooses an advertising expenditure, A, in stage 1, and in stage 2, all n firms compete in quantities to
be produced.  This two-stage game is solved by backward induction, beginning with the stage 2
competition.
Although this model structure is stylized, the basic configuration with a single major
branded product and a broad unbranded or generic market segment, is consistent with a large
number of agricultural industries.  Examples include almonds and Blue Diamond, prunes and
Sunsweet, citrus and Sunkist, cranberries and Ocean Spray, grape juice and Welch’s, peaches and
Del Monte, avacados and Calavo, and raisins and Sunmaid.  Notably most of these industries also
feature or have featured industry advertising campaigns funded by check-off programs.
Equilibrium without Advertising
To provide a benchmark for comparison, we first study the Cournot equilibrium in the absence of
any brand advertising.  The total market demand is:
(1) Q = a – α P,
where a > 0, α  > 0, Q is output, and P is the output price.  The inverse raw product supply is:
(2)       W = b + β Q.
A representative firm i’s objective is to:
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where ￿ is the absolute value of the elasticity of retail demand, ￿ is the elasticity of farm supply,
and si = 1/n is the per-firm market share.  Equation (3-1) indicates that the farm-retail price spread4
under oligopoly-oligopsony is greater the more inelastic are the retail demand and farm supply and
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where superscripts “0” denote equilibirum without advertising.
The Two-Stage Game
We assume that firm 1’s brand advertising segments the retail market and creates monopoly market
power for firm 1 in its branded market.  The demand for firm 1’s branded product is:
(4) [] ) A ( S P ) A ( z a q B B B α − + = ,
where subscript “B” denotes the branded product, A is firm 1’s brand advertising expenditure,  SB, 0
< SB(A) < 1, is the branded product’s share of the total market, and z(A) > 0 denotes advertising’s
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where γ 0 and γ 1 are advertising effectiveness parameters.  The square root specifications insure
diminishing returns to advertising and, hence, interior solutions.  Square root specifications have
been used in several empirical studies of commodity advertising and found to fit the data well (e.g.,
Alston et al., 1997; Alston et al., 1998).  From (1) and (4), the total demand for the non-branded
product (subscript N) is
(6)     QN = [a + z(A) – α PN][1 – SB(A)].
In stage 2, firm 1 chooses qB and qN1 to maximize profit in both the branded and non-
branded market:
(7) Max{qB, qN1}   Π 1 = Π B+ Π N1 = [PB(qB) – W(Q) – c]qB + [PN(QN) – W(Q) – c]qN1,5














































where η j, j = B, N is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for the branded and
unbranded product markets, s1 = (qB + qN1)/Q is firm 1’s share of the total market, and sN1 = qN1/Q
is firm 1’s market share in the non-branded market.
Firm k’s (k = 2, 3, …, n) profit maximization problem is
(8)    Max{qNk}   Π k = [PN(QN) – W(Q) – c]qNk.






















where sNk = qNk/QN is firm k’s market share in the non-branded market, and sk = qNk/Q is firm k’s
market share in the total market.
By substituting equations (1), (2), (4), (5), and (6) into the first-order conditions in (7-1), (7-
2), and (8-1), and by imposing symmetry among firms when appropriate, we obtain the following
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where superscripts “1” denote euilibirum with advertising, X = a + z – α (b + c), 
1
B q i s  f i r m  1 ’s
branded product quantity, 
1
1 N q i s  f i r m  1 ’s non-branded product quantity, 
1
Nk q i s  f i r m  k ’s (non-6
branded) product quantity (k = 2, 3, …, n).  This system of equations can be rewritten as Bq = C,
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The necessary and sufficient condition for farmers to benefit from brand advertising is that total
sales, Q, expand as a consequence of advertising.  We can show that Q
1 > 
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In stage 1 firm 1 chooses A to maximize profits given the ensuing behavior in stage 2:
(10) Max{A}   Π 1(A) – A = Π B(A) + Π N1(A) – A
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This market is characterized by eight parameters: demand and supply curve slope and
intercept terms, farmers’ share, (1 – c), under perfect competition, number of processing firms n,
and the effectiveness of advertising (γ 0 and γ 1).  Given values for these parameters, we can solve for
firm 1’s optimal advertising expenditure A
*, and for the second stage outputs, prices, and producer
welfare.
Simulation Analysis
Because the analytical solutions to the two-stage model are rather complex and, we used simulation
analysis to study the impact of brand advertising on farmer welfare.  We measure farmer welfare in
terms of producer surplus (PS) and specifically compare PS in the equilibria both with and without
brand advertising.  Using the ‘0’ and ‘1’ superscripts to denote, respectively, the equilibrium
without and with brand advertising, we have the following specifications for producer welfare:
 (11) . 1 , 0 ,
2
















 The change in farmers’ surplus due to brand advertising is
(12) ∆ PS = PS
1 – PS
0.
To construct the simulation, we first employed the normalizations available to us.  This was
done by setting the aggregate quantity and retail price each to 1.0 at the Cournot equilibrium with n
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From (3-3), the relations among the parameters are thus: a = 1 + α , b = 1 – c – (1 + 3αβ )/2α .8
The preceding expressions are used to eliminate the supply and demand curve intercepts, a
and b, from the subsequent analysis.  The demand and supply slope parameters α  and β  can be
expressed in terms of the farm supply and retail demand elasticities (￿ and ￿ respectively), each
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We next generated a range of reasonable parameter values for γ 0, the effectiveness of
advertising in expanding total demand, by applying a modified Dorfman-Steiner condition
(Dorfman and Steiner, 1954) to the case of a monopoly/monopsony processing firm who also
advertises.  Given the demand and supply functions from (1) and (2), we can solve for the
monopolist/monopsonist’s optimal advertising expenditure, 
1
m A , quantity, 
1
m Q , and prices,
1
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m Q P / A = χ . Given values for the
demand and supply parameters, we can then set reasonable values for the advertising-sales ratio, χ ,
and solve to find the implied value of γ 0:
Given ￿0, the brand advertising effectiveness parameter was set simply as ￿1 = k￿0, where k
measures the relative effectiveness of advertising at creating brand market share versus expanding
total demand.  Finally, we fixed the farm share parameter 1 – c = 0.5 in all cases.
Simulation Results
Given space limitations, we can present only a brief discussion of the simulation results.  The base
scenario for the simulations involved setting 1 – c = 0.5, 3 = 0.02, and ￿ = 1.5.  The two percent9
advertising-sales ratio is consistent with actual brand advertising-sales ratios for agricultural
industries with a clearly identifiable primary farm industry (e.g., see Marion et al. 1986, Table B-8).
The choice of ￿ = 1.5 is somewhat arbitrary, but the supply elasticity is not an important parameter
in this analysis—as supply becomes more elastic producer surplus decreases under all sets of
market conditions.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the simulation results.  In all cases we examine the change in
producer surplus, ∆ PS, (equation (12)) due to the introduction of brand advertising.  Figure 1
examines the effect on ∆ PS of concentration in the processing sector as measured by n.  Each panel
in Figure 1 features a different choice of k, the relative effectiveness parameter.  Figure 2 examines
the effect of k on ∆ PS, with each panel in Figure 2 depicting an alternative choice of n.  The curves
in both Figures are “iso-demand-elasticities” that depict ∆ PS for a particular value for the elasticity
of demand set at the base Cournot duopoly-duopsony equilibrium.
Figure 1 shows that brand advertising is less likely to benefit farmers when the processing
industry is relatively unconcentrated.  Large values of n imply only limited oligopoly-oligopsony
power in the Cournot equilibrium and, accordingly, high levels of producer surplus.  Creation of
monopoly power through brand advertising therefore has an important adverse effect on producer
welfare.  When k is small so that advertising is only moderately effective at creating brand identify
relative to expanding total demand (panel (a)), farmers benefit for all values of n.  However, for
larger values of k, farmers’ welfare declines from brand advertising when the processing industry is
highly unconcentrated (i.e., when n is large).   For example, in panel (c), when k = 1.8, farmer
welfare declines under any of the demand elasticity specifications for n > 3.  In all instances, the
welfare effect, whether positive or negative, is exacerbated the more elastic is the retail demand
curve.  Farmer welfare is a monotone increasing function of sales, so when demand is relatively
inelastic, the sales effects of brand advertising are small.  When demand is relatively elastic, brand10
advertising can have a large effect on sales (either positive or negative) and, accordingly, a large
effect on farmer welfare.
In Figure 2 higher values of k represent advertising that is increasingly effective at creating
brand market power for the advertising firm. Thus, the firm’s optimal advertising expenditure is
increasing in k.  For small values of k the demand-expanding effect of the higher advertising
dominates the market-power effect, and farmer welfare is increasing in k.  When n is small, e.g., n =
2 in panel (a), farmers benefit for all values of k included in the figure.  In this setting, the market is
a highly concentrated duopoly-duopsony in the absence of brand advertising, so the incremental
market power created by advertising is small and is dominated by the demand-expansion effect.
However, for the larger values of n in panels (b) and (c), the market-power effect from increasing k
comes to dominate the demand-expansion effect, causing farmer welfare to decline.  Again, the
effect, whether positive or negative, is magnified the more elastic is retail demand.
In summary, this paper demonstrates that farmers may gain or lose from brand advertising
by downstream processing firms.  Farmers are most likely to lose when advertising takes place in
relatively unconcentrated processing industries and is relatively more effective at creating brand
identity than at expanding demand in total.  Whether promotion programs intended to enhance
producer welfare should support brand advertising must, thus, be determined on an industry-by-
industry basis based on the criteria set forth here.11
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